Tuesday, September 29, 2009

Observation flight

N978WC
9/28/09
Dilpreet

This is actually my second time sitting in the back seat with Scott and Dilpreet. I remember it being a screaming hot day. I found that observation flights are the best way to review procedures and really see what is going on in the student’s mind. They also help me better understand where my priorities in the airplane lie. The redundancy of the flight helps me register information and retain it better because I see them twice, once before my flight and again during my flight training.

The first time observing Scott gave me a good feel for how the airplane flies. The second time was even better because he was under the hood. Right after takeoff, he retracted his gear and pitched for the blue line. When time permitted, he performed his climb and cruise checklist items and verified them with the checklist. On the way to Lagoon, he had to load an approach and he came up with the brilliant idea of using Autopilot to reduce the workload. He performed the ILS briefing into Ogden and got vectored onto the final approach course. At that point, Dilpreet got the controls and demonstrated an engine out approach. He then broke away from the course so that Scott can get revectored onto the localizer. Scott was given an engine failure inbound on the approach and he knew immediately what to do. He went through the checklist quick though. He maintained directional control very well and when he intercepted the glide slope, the workload was denser. I saw him holding course guidance but he struggled to keep glideslope because so many things were going on all at once. Overall, he handled the procedures really well and was within limits.

A lot of what I’ve observed was all review for me. I had done the same lesson a few days prior. However, I got to see the same procedures performed again which helped stick better in my memory. There were things Scott did that I will use to my advantage on my next flight--Autopilot--and there were some things he did that I would have done the same if I were him but I will now remember not to do when I’m flying. An example would be to not rush through the checklist. I find that rushing through the checklist after a simulated engine failure calls for more mistakes to happen. The biggest thing I learned on the observation flight was to maintain directional control, relax for a brief moment, and then continue the checklist with cool and confidence. I also saw where my power setting needed to be on descent to DA and what to have done before landing. They were all good review and reminders for my next flight.

Monday, September 21, 2009

Aspen Accident

I remember reading or hearing about this accident before and it is a shame how many aircraft consistently become victims to the airport. Knowing that it is an airport surrounded by high terrain, I, as a pilot, would be more alert on flying the procedures especially in IMC. Anytime I hear about an accident such as this, I am deeply sadden more for the passengers than the crew because passengers put their trust on the crew and have no idea what they’ve gotten themselves into. This is another one of those human factor accidents and it shows how important it is to stick with training procedures, listen and look out for unusual feelings because they are an indication that something is likely to go wrong.

The contributing factors to this accident as stated in the report are the captain’s pressure to satisfy the client’s request, bad weather, but mostly poor decision making even after several warnings that an alternate is the better bet. The crew has the hours to prove competency, have been under pressure before and flown in bad weather many times, but Aspen is not the place to make mistakes upon mistakes.

The error chain started well before the accident. The flight did not depart on time and so the crew took off anyway, only to spare 12 minutes before the landing curfew. The error chain would break if the crew diverted to the alternate instead of attempting to fly the approach into Aspen even after they’ve already gone past 30 mins past sunset. Instead, the error chain continued into the approach phase. The crew followed a Challenger who went missed and that should strike a bell, but the crew was determined to land. It wasn’t just that one Challenger that went missed, there were two more that went missed and the crew expressed concerns yet wasn’t concerned enough to discontinue the approach. Into the approach phase, the crew didn’t have the runway in sight but reported that they do in hopes of seeing the runway. At that point, everything they did went steeper downhill. They didn’t listen to the GPWS and crashed short of the runway. They still could have broken the error chain at that point by stopping the descent, but they had too much going on to think straight. Rifle, the alternate airport they chose, never crossed their mind throughout the flight.

It is important that you treat your passengers with respect but when they don’t understand safety and rules, they need to be educated even if it offends them. When they understand that their lives could be on the line, like your job is, they too might understand better where you are coming from. Explain that even if there is another pilot to do the job, he will do the same and put safety and rules first. If he doesn’t, there is a great chance that passenger lives are on the tip of a mountain. Passengers shouldn’t be controlling your professionalism and in this specific accident, I would have landed at the alternate and receive derogatory remarks from my passengers rather than break the rules and be left in a risky situation.

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Single-Pilot IFR

I am no longer IFR current and is now working to get an IPC check. I have always liked instrument training and felt like I was really good it. The last time I've read charts and shot approaches was two years ago and now reviewing procedures for flying approaches suck. I pretty much have to start from the beginning again which is fine, but I would much rather spend my time studying something else. The whole point of blabbing is to advise you to stay IFR current so you won't have to find yourself at a speed bump in the multi-engine training.

Anyway, if I were IFR proficient, I would fly SPIFR any day given some circumstances. I would have to take into consideration who I fly for, how well the aircraft I fly are equipped and maintained, and how bad the weather condition is. I know that the accident statistics on SPIFR operations have greater risks than two-pilot operations, that pilot workload is heavy, and that weather can be daunting. Nevertheless, with good training, good decision-making choices, and lots more experience, flying SPIFR could be like a VFR flight except with 10 times the skill. I think that once you experience more IFR flying and establish the necessary skills, flying SPIFR can eventually become second nature. I'm making this sound a lot easier than it sounds, but I stand firmly on the idea that practice makes better.

Being a confident SPIFR pilot is okay, but I learned from the article that you still have to know your limits and also don't be to complacent with your flying skills. Getting too confident with your flying skills can do harm. I have over 200 hours in the Archer and everytime I get in one to fly, it's like I get into my car. Yet, there are still times when I make small mistakes and decisions that could eventually lead to a problem due to the fact that I think I already know it all. I try to be a bit more modest in the Archer.